The article analyses how responsible decision makers (Members of the Parliament and employees in the Governmental institutions) adopt their decisions on the issues concerning energy security of Lithuania. The article is based on a constructivist security approach. The article explores what the main challenges and threats to Lithuanian energy security are, as identified by responsible decision makers. The article analyses how the concept of "energy security" is perceived by responsible decision makers. Additionally, the article identifies the groups that most influence the positions of the responsible decision makers. Finally, it is stated that energy nationalism dominates the thinking of responsible decision makers, which is perceived as a way to increase energy security.
INTRODUCTION
After closure of the second block of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP), Lithuania imports 79% of its total energy consumption. 1 The Russian Federation is the single supplier of oil and natural gas, while Lithuania imports 60% of gross consumed electricity, most of it from Russia as well, and through its dominated BRELL grid. 2 Lithuanian political and public discourse is dominated by energy security issues as well as discussions on projects that should increase energy security. The Lithuanian government is planning at least three major energy projects: construction of Visaginas NPP, construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipėda port, and electricity grid connections (Power Bridges) with
Sweden and Poland. The Lithuanian government also strives to increase production of local and renewable energy resources. A natural gas pipeline between Lithuania and Poland is also being discussed. But for the time being, Lithuania is very vulnerable to the energy policies of Russia as well as reliability of prices and supply.
These energy projects are outcomes of Lithuanian energy security policy which is constructed on the basis of the quantitative data (consumption, production, import, transit, diversification, etc.), as well as perceptions of challenges, concepts of security and ways those subjective perceptions and interpretations are being constructed. In contrast to the liberal or realistic approach(s), underlining the rationality in decision making, 3 it must be stressed that responsible decision makers are individuals who not only use objectivequantitative data, but also interpret it through their political agenda and personal experience as well as being influenced by different interest groups and discourses.
Subjective perceptions play an even greater role because quantitative data needs inevitable interpretation that might be very different in most cases from what energy security, threats, as well as ways to increase energy security are. The same data could be differently interpreted by various political parties -conservatives, social democrats, liberals, allowing them to interpret data to validate their statements and views. This way quantitative data and subjective interpretations' elements influence their votes and decisions, which become decisions of the state.
The energy security policies as well as all other policies are formed by actorsresponsible decisions makers. The international energy system, the state of domestic energy system, political, economical and social elements creates patterns for the decisions of the responsible decision makers.
Up until now in the field of political sciences and international relations, energy security is dominated by historical descriptive approach through interpretation of various events, or analysis of energy projects and their possible impact on energy security. 4 However, there is a lack of research that would allow understanding what elements of energy are perceived as challenges to energy security, how energy security is perceived and defined, and finally, how energy ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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analyzed, and documents too that finally synthesize all these methods and presented findings. The first part of the article analyzes constructivist approach in the research of energy security, focusing on the Copenhagen School. The second part is the empirical part that presents findings from the interviews with responsible decision makers, using tables of elements, and positions of the interviewees.
Finally, the article ends with conclusions presenting the main insights.
CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ENERGY SECURITY STUDIES
Certain objects and events are not elements of security or threats per se, because assumptions about objects and events as threats or elements of security are constructed through meanings that are given to them. In the studies of energy security, as well as other fields of security, energy resources and elements related to them are securitized not necessarily on the basis of quantitative data, but on perceptions and estimations. Assumptions about security and threats to security depend on political context.
The analytical base of security studies is the Copenhagen School. The
Copenhagen School, developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, can hardly be assessed as theory, but rather as an analytical framework regarded as the emancipation of security studies through a constructive approach. In this school there are three major pillars or ideas: securitization, sectors, and regional security complexes. The concept of securitization is most broadly defined on metatheoretical base of Copenhagen School. 5 Security is defined as freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. 6 Though there are three levels of security: individual, state and national security, the security concept is directly connected with the state and security has to be read through the lens of national security. 7 According to Waever, security problems are developments that threaten sovereignty or independence of the state in a particular rapid or dramatic fashion leading to undercut of political order, while deprive of the capacity to manage by itself. 8 Nevertheless it is argued that "security" is not considered to be a direct consequence of threat, but is defined by political interpretation of that threat. 9 The problems and issues had to be securitized, while the process of "securitization" is described as a discursive construction of a particular issue as security threat. 10 According to Waever, the task of securitization is not to assess objective "real" threats endangering some objects, but rather to construct a shared understanding of what it is to be considered a threat and collectively respond. The process of securitization is considered a speech act 11 while hawing means to resist the threat 12 and only political elite of the stateresponsible decision makers, can name an object or process a security issue -and thus securitize it 13 . The securitization expands state (governmental) power because it takes the issue beyond the established rules of the game, putting it above the normal politics 14 and political institutions can claim their special powers, monopolizing the elements, resources and means needed for de-securitization 15 . It can also be assumed that the institutions might strive to keep expanded power and not to de-securitize the issue even if vulnerability was lowered to "acceptable level", accentuating concept of widening security and "spill" of the issue into other areas. The process of de-securitization is understood as moving issues back to normal politics not necessary creating countermeasures to the threats. 16 This means that an issue can be regarded as a threat to security, but without creating measures only by changed perception, or even without that, the issue might become no longer regarded a threat, or different responsible decision makers can differently perceive the issue and de-securitize it. For this case "security" and "insecurity" are not objective categories, because political elite in the institutions define security and securitize issues. 17 When, after elections or in other cases, new political parties and individuals come to power and form government, they can define security in other manner and de-securitize the issue. Volatility on security and de-securitization is not as high as it could be because even individual responsible decision makers could have very different views on security issues and securitize different objects and processes, the structure of the democratic state determines that different actors must agree on the common denominator. This 18 Increasing concerns of energy security in practical individual, state and international security, as well as increasing research in this area allows arguing that energy security can be regarded as a separate security sector.
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
The qualitative research methodology here focuses on the semi-structured 
CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY
Seeing that energy security is perceived as freedom from threats, that is primarily based on the assessments of the responsible decision makers on what challenges or threats to the normal stance of energy and national security sector exist. Identification of threats for the most part defines energy security.
Interviewees had to name the main challenges for the energy security of Lithuania.
Challenges and threats for energy and national security arising from energy issues are presented in the National Energy Strategy (prepared by the Government of Lithuanian Social Democratic party and coalition) and National Energy Independency Strategy (prepared by Homeland Union -Lithuanian Christian
Democrat Political party in coalition with liberals). It was expected that there would be a high correlation between challenges and threats presented in strategies and the responses of interviewees.
The National Energy Strategy directly connects challenges to energy security with challenges to national security in the articles 6, 7 and 8. In the document, challenges to energy and national security are divided into three spheres:
challenges related to the global processes, challenges related to the regional 21 On 26 June 2012 the National Energy Independence Strategy was adopted by the Lithuanian Parliament. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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the strict environmental requirements set forth to energy enterprises, including restrictions on carbon dioxide (hereinafter referred to as "CO 2 ") emissions. 23 Russia or elements directly related to it remain the main determinants influencing Lithuanian energy security, except for the last environmental challenge.
The only existing gas and electricity interconnections with Russia and not the EU countries indicate the vulnerability of supply, while greater import of electricity from Russia increases vulnerability of supply and price, while the Nord Stream pipeline is also perceived as a challenge.
In the National Energy Independence Strategy it is claimed that Lithuania ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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 Potential of renewable and domestic resources would not be used and low efficiency would lead to increased import of electricity and energy dependency. 24 In the National Energy Independence Strategy all challenges and threats are directly related to the main importer of energy resources -Russia, and dependence on Russia. It was expected that Russia will be named as the main challenge or threat to Lithuanian energy security, but the information of the interviews shows that Russia is the key issue in Lithuanian energy security. In some interviews
Russia was not perceived as a threat to the energy security of Lithuania, but nevertheless it was accentuated as the major determinant of threats.
Nearly all the interviewees claimed that the main challenge to energy security is dependence on a single supplier -Russia. Only one interviewee did not claim that it is challenge to energy security, and this interviewee even argued that dependence on Russia is source of security. The second most mentioned challenge was lack of market principles in the energy sector, but only 3 of 8 interviewees in one form or another mentioned this challenge. Three challenges were mentioned by two interviewees: high prices of energy resources, low energy efficiency and lack of interconnections with EU member states. Other challenges were mentioned only by individual interviewees. The challenge most mentioned relates to core challenges presented in the strategies. It was surprising that interviewees did not have similar positions on other challenges; for instance, energy intensity issues and environmental challenges were not even mentioned, though they are presented in both strategies.
The positions of most interviewees towards Russia as main challenge to
Lithuania's energy security were harsh. Interviewee No. 1 argued that the main challenge is dependence on imported energy resources and "new nuclear power plant in which imported nuclear fuel will be used"; he also claimed that "we [Lithuania] feed energy exporters with our money and at the same time we are dependent on them". Interviewee No. 2 argued that the main challenge is "our
[Lithuanian] energy dependencies -the lack of our freedom to choose the energy providers", he also raised the rhetorical question: "which fool could believe that we gained independence after Russia had withdrawn its military and recognized say it sound, today the wars are not fought with tanks and infantry in these latitudes, they are fought by means of energy and propaganda, and we [Lithuania] are in the middle of the battle". This position shows how extremely securitized the perception of Russia and energy by the responsible decision makers is. On the other hand, Interviewee No. 1 claimed that during his meeting with the members of the Russian Duma he inquired why pipeline Druzhba-2 had broken down, on member of Duma stated that "it was necessary", and pipeline will be fixed "then when it's needed". This shows that the securitization is not based only on misguided perceptions about Russia. Interviewee No. 4 called these kinds of perceptions "geopolitical blindness" and paranoia.
It was surprising that the interviewees named a wide spectrum of possible negative consequences, but they never coincided except for the already mentioned vulnerability of supply for technical of political reasons, and what can be aggregated as category of higher energy resources prices and lack of energy market (mentioned for three times). The identified challenges as well as negative consequences of the challenges influence how "energy security" is defined. As it will be observed later, diversification will dominate the definitions of the concept of "energy security".
Inconsistencies are observed as well, because price of energy resources was much more accentuated than market principles. However, market principles could be perceived as element of diversification. Also, environmental principles while defining energy security were more accentuated than it could be predicted from information received from previous answers, because only two respondents mentioned energy efficiency issue which is directly connected to environmental issues. Only a single interviewee mentioned that plans to construct NPPs' in Belarus and Kaliningrad have no negative effects from the challenges in energy sector, but during the interviews negative perception about these projects was presented by most interviewees.
PROBLEMS DEFINING ENERGY SECURITY
The National Energy Strategy does not present a definition of energy security, though article 5 states that energy security is based on the number of provisions and third and fourth provisions state that:
Energy security covers the totality of the conditions ensuring the diversity of traditional and renewable primary sources of energy, diversity and security of energy supply and independence from dictate of a monopolistic supplier, availability of energy to the consumer at acceptable prices in a competitive energy market;
Lithuania links its energy security to the integration of the country's energy systems into EU energy systems and with an efficient EU and national energy policy, which should ensure that Lithuania's energy security would be on a par with that of other EU states.
26
The National Energy Independency Strategy states that the main aim is to "achieve energy independence by the year 2020, this would strengthen energy 26 National Energy Strategy, supra note 23, Art. 5, Sec. 3-4. that "energy independence" means "Energy needs of Lithuania will be satisfied using domestic energy resources as well as their diversified supply". 28 In another part of the document "energy independence" is defined as "the ability to choose freely the type of energy resources as well as suppliers (including domestic production) that best responds to energy security demands of the state and the interests of Lithuanian consumers, to buy energy resources at most favorable price". 29 The concept of "energy independence" consists of different elements in the text of the Strategy. For example, in the document it is argued that if Lithuania achieves "energy independence" it will become a part of the completely different geopolitical and value space, which is based on market relations and competition, equal conditions and transparency between members of energy market. 30 Overall the Strategy lacks consistency.
Interviewees were asked to define energy security and whether it has connections with concept of "energy independence". Table No lead that "one day we might be asked to change our coat of arms because if we don't, the price of electricity will be double".
Respondents mainly focused on electricity (mainly nuclear, and interconnections with Poland and Sweden) and natural gas when defining energy security, while supply of oil or domestic renewable resources were mentioned only episodically. This might be related to the fact that Lithuania has an oil terminal and can import oil from the global market, though it continues to import it from Russia, because pipeline Druzhba-2 has not been operational since 2006. The presented official documents underline the importance of a market approach to energy security. During the interviews only three respondents mentioned market approach in the context of acceptable prices for energy resources.
To sum up, energy security in most cases was perceived very primitively, basing responses on definitions presented a century ago, accentuating political aspects, while still mainly ignoring elements defining contemporary energy security, like environmental elements. When presenting definitions most of the respondents accentuated sources of energy that are most broadly discussed in the mediaelectricity and natural gas. Analyzing relations between presented official documents and definitions of the respondents, the presented definitions were in most cases closer to the definition of energy security concept presented in the National Security Strategy rather National Energy Independency Strategy. Market principles were mentioned by only 3 respondents. The EU aspect in the definition was not presented, though National Security Strategy and National Energy Independency Strategy underlines this aspect. The presented "energy security"
definitions have strong politicization, and great influence of political scientists as experts when presenting and defining issues of energy security to responsible decision makers.
VIABILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF "ENERGY INDEPENDENCE"
The newly presented strategy was titled the National Energy Independence
Strategy. There were a lot of debates and interpretations concerning the term "energy independence". Introduction of this concept by the Government was not entirely successful. Only half of the interviewees agreed that concepts of "energy independence" and "energy security" have connections. Do not agree that "energy independence" concept has connections with energy security
Though the concept of "energy independence", according to the interviewee from the Ministry of Energy, was created as a concept to promote a better understanding of the essence of "energy security", those two concepts are basically the same concept. Interviewees from the ministries argued that "energy security" and "energy independence" are similar categories, meaning: "the ability to choose freely the type of energy resources as well as suppliers". Similar responses were presented because of the coordination of positions between ministries when presenting them to the public so their argumentation would be essentially similar.
Research shows that not all respondents indicate a connection between "energy security" and "energy independence" concepts. This concept was already criticized by arguing that term should not be used because it is not defined in any regulations. 34 One of the interviewees argued that the concept of "energy independence": "does not say anything, it is demagogic and propaganda, without ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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Non-alignment of the Republic of Lithuania to Post-soviet Eastern Unions" should be mentioned. According to it Lithuania cannot be a member of any unions' in the Post-soviet space "to never join in any form any new political, military, economic or other unions or commonwealths of states formed on the basis of the former USSR", while technical dependency on BRELL, though Lithuania has no agreements signed, could be argued as violation of Constitutional Act. To sum up, the concept of "energy independence", presented by the Ministry of Energy, is not absolutely viable and was not perceived identically by the respondents.
EVALUATION OF ENERGY SECURITY LEVEL
Research was also focusing on how responsible decision makers evaluate the energy security of the Republic of Lithuania, and on what they base their proposed evaluation. Since the evaluation of security is based on subjective perceptions, the question was given to the respondents: "How would you evaluate the level of Lithuania's energy security in the scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 is absolute insecurity as you can imagine, and 10 is absolute security as you can imagine?" there is a lack of self-sufficiency.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF ENERGY SECURITY PERCEPTION
The next step of the research was to find how energy security perceptions were constructed and how responsible decision makers accumulate information to construct their perceptions on energy security leading to adoption of decisions.
Interviewees were asked to identify what data and resources they used when presenting an answer on the energy security level.
Interviewee No. 1 claimed that his answer was based on various research:
Lithuanian Energy Institute, nongovernmental organizations, Ministry of Economy Magnus University. It is obvious that the aforementioned research institutions have real influence on the decision-makers concerning energy security. However, they could mention only one particular research; though a number of interviewees claimed that there is much more research. These responses indicate that during the interviews interviewees want to present themselves as having more knowledge than they really do, because they cannot specify more researches or institutions.
Interviewee No. 3 claimed that all the methods of energy security level assessment are known to him, but he was not able to mention particular method, research or institution.
It also can be assumed that information from the secret services has much greater impact on energy policy than it was mentioned in the interviews. Not all respondents wanted to reveal that they are working with sensitive information, but the ways that energy resources supply from Russia are securitized (how challenges and their negative effects are presented in the Strategies and in the interviews)
illustrate that the assumption of the importance of secret services information is high. Reliance on information of secret services would explain connections between Economists can be described as a less influential group, because only three interviewees claimed that they consult with economists or that positions of economists are important to them. Concerning development of energy security projects economists can be assessed as group with not enough influence. In the National Energy Independence Strategy it is claimed that "in order to reach energy independence public sector will have to invest 11 to 13 billion LTL (Lithuanian Litas) 
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING ENERGY NATIONALISM
In the National Energy Strategy and the National Energy Independence When assessing the impact of NPP projects in Belarus and Russia on Lithuanian energy security Interviewee No. 1 claimed that these projects negatively influence the energy security of Lithuania, because they will be developed on two main rivers flowing through territory of Lithuania, and it will be contaminated with radionuclides. At the same time interviewee argued that, although NPP in Visaginas will be constructed next on the border with Belarus, it will not contaminate Belarusian territory, because NPP will use water to cool reactor from the lake friend".
Interviewee No.5 argues that there is a big competition because "they and national security. According to the interviewee NPP in Belarus will be built only 50 kilometers from Lithuanian capital, the site is chosen wrongly because of tectonic and geological aspects, and water to cool the reactor will be probably used from river Neris. Concerning economic issues, the interviewee argued that those projects will prevent development of Lithuanian economy. The interviewee also claimed that there are concerns for national security: "it is impossible to reject political motives behind those projects in order to prevent Lithuania from developing independent energy policy". When the interviewer stated that Belarus and Russia present the same issues concerning the Lithuanian NPP project, the interviewee argued that there is a need to defend Lithuanian project "in order not to be subordinated to the system or interests we do not trust".
Interviewee No. 7 agreed only to give his personal opinion arguing that projects will affect not energy, but national security: "there is a probability that those projects will be not safe and not transparent, and there are possibilities for radiation contamination". According to the interviewee project will not have negative consequences in the energy sector.
Interviewee No. 8 claimed that NPP projects developing in Belarus and Kaliningrad are not safe and they are being developed irresponsibly, because though all the necessary research and environmental impact assessments had not been done, works on the sites are still in process. In addition, these projects might have a enormously negative impact on Lithuanian national security in case of accident.
The perception on Visaginas NPP can be considered positive, while the perception of Belarusian and Russian NPP projects was negative, and the possibility of radiation contamination was mentioned as well as threats to national security. This naturally leads responsible decision makers to put energy supply diversification as the core element of energy security concept and only then mention diversification of resources, self-sufficiency, acceptable price, political security and environmental security. All the elements, except for diversification of supplies, were mentioned by half or less of the interviewees. This allows for arguing that the perception of responsible decision makers about energy security is narrow and based on the element presented nearly century ago. Narrowness of energy security perceptions were represented by the focus on the issues on certain energy resources. Interviewees focused only on energy resources sectors that dominate public discourse -natural gas and electricity, while oil supply or renewable resources were left aside.
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The concept of "energy independence" is criticized and is not perceived as a valid concept by the interviewees-even the interviewee from the Ministry of Energy who presented this concept argued that this concept should be understood as independence from Russian supplies energy networks. Nevertheless the newest energy strategy is titled National Energy Independence Strategy.
Responsible decision makers assess Lithuanian energy security as pre-critical, Lithuania and Latvia on route of interconnection with Sweden. In general, energy nationalism is built not on an analysis of the existing situation, but on the perceptions that there will be possible issues in the future. This leads to the assumption that energy issues in Lithuania will remain securitized in the future because they expand state power. Perceptions about Russia will probably remain unchanged, as well as the actions of Russia in the energy sector, despite that the
